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Collective Loans for Bulgaria’s Self-Employed: 
A Field Study of Social and Financial Capital 
on Enterprise Growth
Shad Morris'  ^
Cornell University
The purpose o f this paper is to increase understanding o f how collective lending 
strategies leverage social capital to improve firm performance. Drawing on economic and 
sociological perspectives and fieldwork in Bulgaria, I argue that social capital may enhance the 
effects o f financial capital on firm performance in microenterprises. Findings show that a 
collective lending strategy facilitates greater firm performance than individual lending— due 
partially to the increased social capital it creates for the entrepreneur. These findings come 
from a multi-method field study conducted in Bulgaria, where qualitative data were collected 
from over 40 business owner interviews. The fmdings have implications for theoretical and 
practical application within the field o f microfinance.
Introduction
The collapse o f communism over a decade ago created a group of rapid-growth nations 
in Central and Eastern Europe. These nations are known as transition markets because they are 
committed (in varying degrees) to strengthening their economies through private enterprise 
growth (Hoskisson, et al., 2000). However, due to the closure o f many state-owned firms, 
millions o f people have experienced difficulty in finding employment. Their option has been to 
either keep searching for employment or go into business for themselves. Many chose the 
later, and thus gave rise to a new economic group known as microentrepreneurs. The recent 
emergence o f microentrepreneurship in Central and Eastern Europe warrants more research to
 ^ Shad S. Morris is co-founder of the Journal of Microfinance. He has received the National Security David L. 
Boren Fellowship and the J. William Fulbright Scholarship to research microfinance and its effects on 
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help understand and prescribe methodologies that help these entrepreneurs survive and succeed 
in spite o f their nations’ economic difficulties.
While broad agreement exists about the importance o f examining microenterprises in 
transition economies (Aldrich and Reese, 1993; Peng and Lou, 2000), there is very little 
research that examines how microentrepreneurs’ social relations can affect their economic 
performance. Research that does exist tends to focus more on aspects o f financial capital as a 
source o f entrepreneurial opportunity (Bohata & Mladek, 1999; Cook, 1999; Gerard & Prabhu, 
2000; Pissarides, 1999) or on the social good that comes from microenterprise lending (see 
Woller, Dunford, & Woodworth, 1999, for overview o f social versus economic arguments in 
microlending programs). While availability o f financial capital is identified as a major concern 
for entrepreneurial firms in transition economies (Pissaridas, 1999), how financial capital is 
accessed can offer even more insights into improving the circumstances for such firms 
(Watchel, 1999).
This paper attempts to combine the economic with the social approach o f showing how 
collective lending strategies facilitate social capital, and thus, impact performance o f  
entrepreneurial start-up firms in transition economies. Unlike financial capital, social capital 
inheres in the structure o f relations between individuals and among individuals. Social capital 
consists o f the social relationships between individuals, and importantly affects how financial 
capital is used to improve firm performance. Financial capital intermediaries, much like 
venture capital firms, can be potential sources o f personal contacts for young firms (Freeman, 
1999; Podolny & Castellucci, 1999). Such contacts often become “the fmal arbiter o f  
competitive success” (Burt, 1992, p.58). Social capital is especially important for new ventures 
because they provide information, provide access to more resources, and improve reputation 
(Burt, 1992, Larson, 1992).
Addressing issues o f financial capital and social capital, the paper does the following. 
(1) Examines the defmition o f entrepreneurship in transition economies and discusses the need 
for financing microenterprises. (2) Argues that social relationships also play an important 
factor in the development and growth o f microenterprises. (3) Discusses the methodology used 
to examine two separate lending strategies geared toward microentrepreneurial firms in 
Bulgaria. The first method is to offer individual loans, where the borrowing institution is 
required to have two or more guarantors. This is the more traditional lending model adopted 
fi"om commercial banks. The second method consists o f financial loans within a collective 
body of firms that is responsible for the repayment o f each individual’s loan. More 
specifically, an organization offers collective lending to smaller and potentially higher risk 
firms as a way to mitigate risk. Firms in collective groups assembled by the lending institution 
receive individual loans but are responsible for the repayment o f all group members’ loans. 
Thus generating a need for support among group members. (4) Examines the findings o f 
exploratory work on young entrepreneurial firms in Bulgaria. And (5) discusses the possible 
implications o f fmancial and social capital on improving the conditions o f microentrepreneurs 
in Bulgaria.
I. Financing Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies
According to Shane and Venkataraman (2000), entrepreneurship should be studied in 
terms o f sources o f opportunities and the actors who discover, evaluate, and exploit these 
opportunities. Thus, this study examines the entrepreneurship o f micro-business owners in how 
they exploit new opportunities for creating wealth (Aldrich, 1990; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Singh
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& Lumsden, 1990). Access to financial capital is one source o f opportunity for new 
entrepreneurial firms. Another source o f opportunity for entrepreneurial firms is how this 
capital is accessed.
Research shows that among small firms the lack o f financial capital is an obstacle to 
firm growth and performance. Central and Eastern Europe, however, are the only regions 
where lack o f financial capital is one o f the top three most important obstacles (Brunetti, 
Kisunko, & Weder, 1997). Pissaridas (1999) argues that this can be greatly attributed to the 
fact that transition economies are characterized by underdeveloped capital markets in which 
access to credit is based on historically determined working practices and networks that closely 
link state banks with state and other large enterprises.
Practically speaking, looking at the various regions throughout the world. Central and 
Eastern Europe presents a unique situation in that it consists almost entirely o f semi­
industrialized nations. The education and literacy levels are similar, if  not higher than most 
found in developed market economies. The landscapes are filled with factories and modem 
equipment used in technology, textiles, mining, and other such industries. This is the only 
region in the world with high levels o f education and modernization, whose small business 
entrepreneurs suffer from such a lack of access to financial capital.
Offering small loans to the smallest and newest o f entrepreneurial firms has the 
potential to serve as an engine o f growth for many transition economies. Jeffrey Franks (1998), 
o f the IMF, states that there is already evidence that lending efforts for small start-up 
entrepreneurial firms has achieved macroeconomic importance in countries such as 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Bolivia. By focusing on the smallest entrepreneurial firms and 
supplementing their start-up and early growth efforts, the proverbial entrepreneurial ball starts 
rolling. Once a business record is established and the firm has built up a credit history, it will 
be able to obtain credit from larger lending institutions. And thus, contribute to the transition 
of the economy.
n. An Argument for Social Capital
Clearly, accessing financial capital is a vital source o f opportunity for microenterprises 
in transition economies. However, how this capital is accessed plays an important role in how 
the microenterprise will perform and develop. If the way in which financial capital is accessed 
is done so that an entrepreneurial firm is able to not only create new business ties, but 
strengthen them as well, then this firm is able to build a source of strategic opportunities (Uzzi,
1999). Ties are said to be strong and “social” when elements o f trust, reciprocity, and mutual 
forbearance creep into the business transactions. When a firm creates strong social ties 
between and among other firms and focuses on material exchanges o f resources and 
information as the basis o f exchange, then these ties are said to be structurally embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985). Embedded social relationships offer a potential link between sociological 
and economic accounts o f firm behavior. It refers to the process by which social relations 
shape economic actions in ways that some mainstream economists overlook (Crosby & 
Stephens, 1987). The argument is that structural conditions (e.g., how a lending process is laid 
out) facilitate the creation o f social capital.
As stated by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital is the sum o f the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Such relationships are sources of 
opportunity for a firm to improve performance because they depend on aspects o f trust and
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goodwill not found in rational economic models. The term “social capital” first appeared 
around the turn o f the 20* century in a community development study conducted by Lyda 
Judson Hanifan, who argued that “social capital...refer[s] to...those tangible assets [that] count 
for most in the daily lives o f people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit” (Hanifan, 1916, p. 
130). Early pioneers o f the social capital movement also include Jacobs (1965), Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1970), and Loury (1977). However, it was not until 1988, when the Chicago 
sociologist James Coleman developed a comprehensive theory o f social capital that imported 
the economists’ principle o f rational action for use in the analysis o f social systems (Coleman, 
1988). His primary goal was not to create a theory o f social structure, but to create a theory that 
builds upon neoclassical economic analysis that admits a social context.
The purpose o f social capital, as defined by embedded ties, is to help understand how 
social structure assists economic performance. In particular, the newfound success o f social 
capital has created new conjectures on how social networks can create competitive advantage 
over a market-based exchange system (Powell, 1990; Inzerilli, 1991; Perrow, 1992). Thus, 
while modem economic perspectives offer understanding o f how financial and other forms o f 
physical capital improve economic performance, they faintly recognize the influence o f social 
capital on economic performance.
Collective lending can be seen as a tool to increase social capital. As firms understand 
that their borrowing conditions are dependent upon whether or not others repay, they develop 
an interest in making sure fellow group members’ businesses do well. As they begin to help 
each other they develop aspects o f goodwill, trust, and reciprocity that go on even after the loan 
cycle(s) is(are) complete. This lending methodology also attempts to break down potentially 
harmful networks carried over from old economic systems by creating new and varied business 
groups that can come together to compete against well-connected and established firms. 
However, one potential downfall o f these lending groups is that if  and when businesses fail in 
their loan repayment then the opposite affect o f distrust and resentment might occur—creating 
what many have called social liability or the downside o f social capital (e.g., Portes & 
Landholt, 1996). Below, I report results and formulate arguments that attempt to address how 
the process in which financial capital is accessed affects the formation o f social capital between 
firms, and thus enhances economic performance o f start-up entrepreneurial firms in transition 
economies.
in. Research Methodology
Field and ethnographic analysis at 44 micro start-up firms and 4 microfinance 
institutions in 7 separate regions of Bulgaria was conducted. Bulgaria was selected as the 
research site because o f the Central and Eastern European Countries, Bulgaria was the first to 
receive a financial program that offers loans to microenterprises (Morris, 2000). Thus, while 
other Central and Eastern European countries have surpassed Bulgaria in the past few years 
regarding numbers and size o f financial institutions offering these micro-loans, Bulgaria has a 
deeper and more established history o f microlending.
The microentrepreneurial sector in Bulgaria, as well as all o f Central and Eastern 
Europe consists o f low barriers to entry, which results in firms trying to compete on price 
because there are few sources o f opportunity to create niches in the market. Much o f the 
individuals in the small retail business are self-employed artisans, or engage in service 
activities, ranging from peddling flowers in street markets to operating a small chain o f
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computer stores. Because products from suppliers and demands from consumers are limited, 
economic theory makes strong predictions that social ties should play a minimal role in 
economic performance (Hirschman, 1970). This type o f market setting is thus an extremely 
cautious setting in which to examine how lending methods facilitate the creation o f social 
capital, and how social capital mediates the effects o f financial capital on microenterprises in 
transition economies.
A representative sample o f firms that had received loans from every micro-lending 
company in Bulgaria was selected (there were only two companies offering such loans). One 
company offered individual loans in which borrowers were only required to work with the loan 
officer and get two to three guarantors to vouch for them. The second company offered 
collective loans in which borrowers were required to form in-groups, where everyone had to 
qualify for a loan together by making sure everyone had a feasible business growth plan. The 
borrowers were not required to work with each other or even communicate with one another 
outside o f initial group meetings at the lending organization. These two lending organizations 
operated in separate cities to account for the bias that may come from the fact that people with 
a stronger disposition to work collectively may choose collective loans versus individual loans. 
The firms were selected from lists o f all the clients provided by the Directors o f each 
microfinance institution to help decide which firms would offer a sample that would vary in 
age, sales, product line, employment, location, and type to insure a proper industry 
representation o f small start-up firms in Bulgaria (See table 1). Such precautions helped to 
minimize the possibility that social capital creation could be attributed to industry homogeneity 
or size (Portes & Sensebrenner, 1993).
The analysis focused on only the smallest o f the formal, legal start-up firms in the major 
regions of Bulgaria. This was conveniently controlled for because part o f the mission o f the 
microfinance institutions is to lend only to the smallest legitimate entrepreneurial firms. The 
number o f employees in the firms owned by those interviewed consisted on average o f three 
employees. Number o f employees is used to describe the size o f the company in accordance 
with Eastern European standards. According to the most recent law on small and medium 
enterprises in Bulgaria, a micro-firm consists o f all firms with 10 or fewer employees (Morris,
2000). The average age o f the firms interviewed was three years old. However, the average 
age o f the firms when they received their loans ranged from one to two years. Younger firms 
were not available for analysis because the lending institutions that offered the loans had to 
make sure that the new company had at least been able to get a footing in the industry. For this 
purpose, this research was able to look at firms that had a prior opportunity to create social 
relationships in the industry. It used their social relationships prior to receiving the loan as a 
benchmark from which to decipher how much the network improved or deteriorated.
The typical small business start-up in Central and Eastem Europe consists mainly of 
service, manufacturing, and retail companies. The advantages of being a small business 
entrepreneur, whether in a rural or urban setting, are that there is low entry and exit costs, and 
low overhead. For many o f the entrepreneurs, it was not that expensive to start at a very small 
level. Often they started the businesses out o f a rented stand or shop. The main strategy in 
business start-up in Central and Eastem European countries is to gather money from friends 
and family, rent a small stand in the open market, and purchase a few supplies to sell. The only 
problem with this method is that it almost never affords someone the opportunity to expand the
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business. After paying taxes and paying overhead, almost nothing is left for expansion and 
growth/
This study followed grounded theory building techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984) in order deeper understand how social and economic factors affect 
start-up firms in transition economies. The in-depth field methods used help provide rich 
contextual data for theorizing and conducting a detailed analysis o f interfirm relationships, how 
they are formed and how they function. Also, because very little academic research has been 
done at the microentrepreneur level, a more inductive exploratory approach to this study was 
necessary to understand what is actually taking place within and between these firms. The 
study was done in five steps.
First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the microfinance institutions’ 
directors and at least one loan officer. These interviews tried to get at what was going on and 
what types o f questions should be asked in interviews with the entrepreneurial firms.
Second, loan officers were interviewed and questioned on what levels o f firms they lend 
to, and what the variance between the firms is. This was done to get a picture o f the 
homogeneity o f the borrowing firms. A practitioner demographic study that had been done on 
a large representative sample o f the entire small sized firms in Bulgaria was also reviewed. 
This sample allowed me to see which category the firms that were receiving loans fell into. 
From this information firms were selected that would offer a representation across the board o f  
all the firms receiving loans from these lending companies. However, this method was not 
completely void o f bias because o f the fact that once categories were selected, many o f the 
interviewed firms were selected by the loan officer— w^ho may tend to offer only successful 
companies.
Third, demographic data was collected from the lending companies on the pre-selected 
firms for interviewing (e.g., firm age, size o f loan, type o f industry, etc.). Most o f this data was 
used to control for the effects o f social and financial capital on firm performance. Asking these 
same questions from the business owners themselves also validated this data.
Fourth, the first four interviews were used as more exploratory in order to look for 
valuable information than presented in the literature. The only difference between these 
interviews and the ones to follow is that double the normal time was taken to interview the 
entrepreneurs. These first interviews helped tease out some of the information that was not 
pertinent to the research objective. All interviews were semi-structured and on site o f the start­
up firm, so as to allow for field observation as well. The owners and founders o f every 
organization except for two were interviewed. For these two organizations, the next person up 
in the organization was interviewed, which happened to be the most senior employee o f a two- 
and three-employee firm.
The interview consisted o f seven set questions or objectives in order to gather specific 
information on each firm. However, the questions were only asked at appropriate times in the
 ^An example can be seen in the activities of one particular borrower under the alias name o f Doncho. Doncho had 
a small cosmetics stand in the open market. He would often work 12-hour days, 6 days a week. He started his 
business in 1994. For three years Doncho tried to expand his business and move past the start-up phase o f simply 
breaking even. After trying over and over to receive a loan for business expansion, Doncho met up with one o f the 
microfinance institutions in Bulgaria. Within a month Doncho received his first business expansion loan. With 
this loan he expanded his business by increasing his product line in depth and breadth. Eight months later Doncho 
received a second, larger loan. With the second loan he rented another stand and hired two people. Within a 
year’s time Doncho was able to almost double his monthly profit. Doncho is only one success story o f many, but 
he demonstrates the difficulty of business growth without access to capital for expansion.
discussion. This was done in order to allow the interviewee to not feel constrained from being 
able to tell about the relations they had formed with other borrowers. For example, how the 
loan had affected the firm’s growth, and how their social ties had improved or worsened after 
receiving the first loan was asked. It was directly asked if  the interviewee felt he or she had 
financially benefited not only from the loan, but also from the extra support they had received. 
Interviewees were also asked how their performance improved— looking for specific examples 
such as facility expansion, new employees, improved life circumstances, etc.
They were also asked to provide examples o f how their social networks had improved. 
If the interviewee only responded that they have more friends now because o f the loan or if  
they weren’t in depth, probing was done to understand what new ties had been created and 
what this has directly done to improve business. Non-directive questions were used to probe, 
for example, "Can you tell me more information about any possible relationships you have built 
after receiving your loan?”, and “How have these new relationships affected you and your 
business?".
After having discussed how their ties had improved or not improved, the entrepreneur 
was asked to rate the network improvement from a 1 to 7 scale. 1 being no improvement, and 7 
being very much improvement. The interviewees was also asked to rate their company’s 
performance before the loan and after they had time to implement the growth strategy to their 
firm from the loan they had received. The difficulty in this question was to avoid self-reporting 
bias. Thus, caution was taken to get as many details about the actual improvement o f the firm. 
The interviews also improved construct validity by asking the loan officers to verify on the 
self-reported improvements made by many o f the firms. The results were consistent with what 
the loan officers said and what the entrepreneurs reported.
Financial statements o f each firm were also requested, but only five reports were 
obtained due to the fact that the accounting that went on in many o f the firms was not 
structured and that many o f the firms did not feel comfortable releasing actual financial 
statements. Notes were taken during all interviews to ensure detail.
The final step came immediately after collecting all the data (so as to not loose the 
context). Notes were transcribed into a more narrative form. The study also consisted of Likert 
scales from the interviews and ran ordinal logit comparisons of the likert scores and the 
archival data. The statistical results are used only to offer support for the qualitative findings o f 
this study. The paper’s intent is not to validate the field research, but to offer a starting point 
for future research on microentrepreneurship in transition economies.
rV. Dependent Variable
A. Performance
A firms performance was determined by subtracting post-condition o f company by pre­
condition of company and creating a separate variable measuring improved firm performance 
from time one to time two (pre- and post-conditions are based on a 1-7 Likert Scale-l=poor 
financial condition, 4=moderate condition, 7=excellent condition). The creation o f this 
variable, rather than regressing each variable in a separate model, is justified in Allison’s 
(1996) notion that if  a variable is the same across time, then it is possible to create one variable 





Because there are only two types o f loans available to the small start-up entrepreneurial 
sector, the loan process that an entrepreneur had to go through to obtain a loan was put into a 
binary variable.
B. Social Relationships
The social relationships were determined by in-depth interviews and a self report o f 
how much the entrepreneur’s social relationships have improved since the implementation o f 
the loan. A seven point likert scale was used to code the information (l=no effect, 4=moderate 
increase in business ties, 7=great increase in business ties).
VI. Control Variables
Variables entered into the models as controls included firm size, firm age, and loan size. 
Firm size was measured using a logarithm o f the number o f employees, and used because larger 
firms are more likely to outperform smaller firms. This variable was logged because the data 
was skewed to the right. The age o f each firm was included to control for any advantages 
associated with increased time for growth and development o f social networks or learning 
curve advantages in performance. Loan size was used to account for improved performance 
based on the size o f the loan.
V n. Findings
A. Field Findings
Entrepreneurs interviewed perceive that the content and structure o f ties between firms 
directly affected firm performance. The overwhelming feeling among those who received 
collective loans and those who received individual loans is that when a company is embedded 
in interfirm ties, then their business will do better. Embedded ties (or a strong social network) 
between firms was perceived as consisting o f “you don’t help another person with their 
business because it’s good for you. You do business with a person because it’s good for them 
and you have friendship ties.” Another popular depicting statement was, “if  I’m doing well, 
and my friend is hurting, I should help him Qier] out.”
While those who received individual loans felt the importance o f social capital, they 
seemed to have a much more difficult time improving social capital than those who had 
received a collective loan. Often the entrepreneur who received the individual loan reported 
that while they have improved their social relationships since receiving the loan, the social 
relationships they’ve built have been close in proximity, which were usually people selling or 
making similar products. It also seemed that the loan had nothing to do with them building 
more and stronger interfirm ties.
The report from those who received a collective loan had all sorts o f stories to relate on 
how the collective lending process allowed them to meet and work with people whom they 
never before would have worked. One entrepreneur mentioned “I now have contacts in 
different lines o f business that I can refer my own clients to .. .in retum, he tells his clients about 
me.” One example is seen in a borrower whom I’ll call Tonya. Tonya owns a souvenir shop 
and has a friend, Boris, who owns a sandwich shop. They have become friends from the 
borrowers meetings and refer their customers to each other about the other’s shop. They also
find out from their customers what they think o f the other’s shop and then meet and give 
feedback.
B. Statistical Approach
An ordinal logit model was used to estimate the relationships o f the independent and 
mediating variables with the categorical and ordered dependent variable. This means that the 
actual values taken by the dependent variable do not matter except that larger values are 
assumed to correspond to “higher” outcomes. And since the data is qualitative by nature, 
ordinal logit analysis is suitable.
In an ordinal logit model, an underlying score is estimated as a linear function o f the 
independent variables and a set o f cut points. The probability o f observing a specific 
performance outcome corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function, plus 
random error, is within range o f the cut points estimated in the outcome. This equation is 
written out in ( 1):
P(outcomej = /) = P PiXij+ P2X2j+- • •+ PkXkj+Uj < ki) (1)
In ordered logit, uj is assumed to be logistically distributed. The coefficients pi, p2,..., Pk are 
estimated along with the cut points /ci, K2 ,..„ k\.\  ^where i is the number o f possible outcomes, kq 
is taken as -oo and k\ is taken as +oo. This is a direct generalization o f the ordinary two-income 
logit model. The coefficients and cut points are estimated using maximum likelihood, and no 
constant appears because the effect is absorbed into the cut points (Long, 1997)
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and variable interrelations. Results o f the ordinal 
logit model analyses appear in Table 3. Because o f the robustness o f the ordinal logit model, 
assumptions o f heteroskedasticity and normality were not violated. Also, ordinal logit models 
are particularly adept for analyzing data with small sample sizes.
From the statistical tests performed on the measurable data sets obtained from archival 
and interview sources, this study furthers support for the qualitative findings that the 
differences in firm performance are effected by whether or not a firm received a collective loan 
or individual loan, and mediated by how much this improved the firm’s social capital.
Social scientists have long recognized the importance o f mediating variables in 
understanding path dependence. Woodworth’s (1928) Stimulus-Organism-Response model, 
which recognized that an active organism intervenes between stimulus and response, is 
probably the earliest formulation o f a mediation hypothesis. The central idea in such a model is 
that the effects o f stimuli (loan process) on behavior (how the firm performs) are mediated by 
various transformation processes internal to the organism (the formation o f social capital). 
Many social science theorists have shared the belief in the importance of postulating structures 
and interactions that intervene between input and output (Baron & Kermy, 1986). Positing 
social capital as a mediator explains how external market events take on inter-firm social 
significance. Social capital speaks to the issue o f why collective loans correlate with higher 
performance. Social capital is tested as a mediator using the three models in table 3. From the 
results, it is clear that social capital is a strong mediator between the type o f loan a firm 
receives and firm performance.
Social capital was first regressed on the type o f loan a firm received. Second, 
performance was regressed on type of loan. And in the last model, performance was regressed 
on social capital and type o f loan. The correlations between the appropriate variables in order
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to predict perfect mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) were all significant (p < .05). None o f the 
control variables significantly correlated with performance, and none o f them expressed 
multicollinearity to each other or the independent variables (p < .05).
None o f the control variables offered significant coefficients to explain for differences 
due to company size, loan amount, and age. A commonality that was seen in the general 
sample o f the small entrepreneurial firms is that the entrepreneurs were all young firms that 
only had enough time to get their footing. A strong argument in defense o f the importance o f 
social capital is that the average loan size for those receiving individual loans was slightly, but 
insignificantly higher than those receiving collective loans (see table 3). Financial economics 
would automatically assume that access to larger amounts o f working and investment capital 
would create greater benefits for the firm, but the results show the opposite.
VIU. Discussion
Though difficult and forlorn with many disadvantages, entrepreneurship is one o f the 
only strategies available for survival and opportunity in transition economies. This trend will 
continue as Central and Eastern Europe continues in its massive reform efforts. When 
microentrepreneurs were asked what their main constraints were, they almost always said it 
was the lack o f money and access to credit—as was the case with Doncho, Tonya, and others. 
Microentrepreneurs not only lack access to credit, but also do not have many productive assets 
and too little amount o f business knowledge. After having lived 45 years under communism, 
entrepreneurship is still in its infancy. Microentrepreneurs are just now beginning to 
understand the importance o f access to capital as well as the importance o f social networks in 
expanding their business opportunities. Because o f the many small stands and companies 
selling or making the same products, the more successful entrepreneurs are those that can gain 
the loyalty o f regular customers and associates. The social capital networks created among 
entrepreneurs are invaluable in that they share business tips and help one another to be more 
competitive.
Microlending companies that provide loans to small start-up entrepreneurial firms are 
usually able to alleviate these resource constraints. In most cases, however, the networking 
opportunities from receiving a collective loan helped many businesses obtain new ideas as to 
ways o f improving their services.
In all the interviews conducted, people’s gratitude for the loans they received and the 
social relationships they were able to build as a result was almost unanimous. While some 
people were not happy with every lending policy, every entrepreneur expressed appreciation 
for receiving access to working or investment capital. Most o f the entrepreneurs had never had 
a loan before, and most had previously tried for a loan from the traditional sources. One 
individual who owns a small convenience store said that before receiving a loan, she was bitter 
at the world— she thought that no one would help the small businessperson struggling in 
Bulgaria. She only saw the government and foreign organizations helping the big firms. When 
she received her first loan she regained hope and found more colleagues with whom she could 
share ideas and receive help. She stated, “They [the lending organization] are the only people 
who are helping the small business owners here in Bulgaria.” These micro-lending 
organizations are reaching a socio-economic level o f people who have not received any type o f 
opportunity to grow in the new free market. With the average repayment rate o f 97%, the 
smallest businesses o f Central and Eastern Europe are proving that they can be actual
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competitors and contributors in the economy when given access to credit that allows them to 
create social capital.
These entrepreneurs face many disadvantages and challenges to their survival. They 
receive no government help or even protection. The one area that can and has shown to be 
effective in helping the microentrepreneurs is the disbursements o f small loans for the 
businesses to use as working and investment capital in such a way that they are able to come 
together and help each others’ growth and transition to larger firm status. With access to credit, 
the microentrepreneurs are not only given an opportunity to care better for their families; they 
are empowered to improve their lives in a manner they feel is most important.
In the 1997 conference on Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies o f Central and 
Eastem Europe, sponsored by the Berkley Center for Entrepreneurship at New York University 
and the Institute for East West Studies, it was concluded that what entrepreneurs need most in 
transition economies is financing (Watchel, 1999). This paper argues that not only financing 
for entrepreneurs is important, but that the type o f financing offered facilitates opportunities for 
social capital formation that can then lead to improved performance on top o f the effects fi-om 
financial capital. Those firms that are given networking opportunities are able to utilize this 
and create social capital, which will boost performance as well. These arrangements facilitate 
the formation o f two implications:
Implication 1: Collective lendingstratesies are more likely to improve a start-up firm’s 
social capital than individual lendins strategies.
Implication 2: Start-up firms with sr eater amounts o f social capital are more likely to 
outperform firms with less social capital
XI. Conclusion
This study examines microentrepreneurial firms by virtue o f their newness to the market 
as well as their creative exploitation o f financial capital in regard to social capital formation. 
Access to financial capital is one source o f opportunity for microentrepreneurial firms, but how 
this capital is accessed can be another source o f opportunity for the firm. My intention was to 
increase understanding o f how collective lending strategies facilitate social capital formation, 
which in turn impact firm performance in Central and Eastem European entrepreneurial start­
up firms. I drew upon economic and sociological perspectives to support the research 
conducted in Bulgaria. The ethnographic data is where the story o f social capital in 
microentrepreneurial firms lies... the statistical data is only a validation o f what is taking place 
in these transition economies. Using a structural embeddedness approach, I proposed that when 
entrepreneurial firms receive collective loans, versus individual loans, they are more likely to 
increase their social capital. Thus, when trust and number of ties are increased the influence of 
financial capital on performance will be enhanced by the mediating effect o f the increased 
social capital.
One limitation o f this study is that the statistical analysis is drawing from a small 
sample size. Future research should focus on obtaining a larger sample so as to be able to make 
stronger validity claims in backing up the qualitative analysis. Another limitation to this study 
is that though the location for the research was deliberately chosen for generalizability 
purposes, a cross-country study would be helpful to make the propositions even more widely 
applicable.
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Not only should research be conducted to further these propositions for smaller firms in 
transition economies, but they should also offer insight on how large firms in developed 
economies might benefit from the development o f social capital through collective financing 
strategies found in joint ventures, partnerships, alliances, and so on. Future research should 
look at how collective finance strategies might offer competitive benefits to firms o f all sizes 
and geographic locations willing to develop social capital with their competitors— t^hus 
expanding the important benefits that come from collective financing strategies that develop 
trust, goodwill, and reciprocity in a competitive open-market environment.
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B usiness F ocus B usiness Sector
Travel agency Tourism
Independent Taxi Driver Service
Shoe store Retail Sales
Clothing store Retail Sales
Cosm etics store Retail Sales
Auto parts distribution shop Retail Sales
Aquarium store Retail Sales
Produce Store Retail Sales
Dental supply company Retail Sales
Convenience store Retail Sales
Shoe store Retail Sales
Leather goods store Retail Sales
Book store Retail Sales
W om en’s clothing store Retail Sales
Kitchenware store Retail Sales
N ovelty store Retail Sales
Convenience store Retail Sales
Sporting goods store Retail Sales
Cosm etics shop Retail Sales
Car parts m achine Shop Manufacturing
W ood product manufacturing plant Manufacturing
Printing Press Manufacturing
Furniture manufacturing company Manufacturing
W indow blind manufacturing company Manufacturing
Furniture Manufacturing company Manufacturing
Advertising firm M anagement Services




Sweet shop Food Services




Sweet shop Food Services
Sweet shop Food Services
Fur hat manufacturing company Apparel Production
Nightwear manufacturing company Apparel Production
Clothes manufacturing company Apparel Production
Seamstress Apparel Production
Designer clothes manufacturing company Apparel Production
Total 42 Interview s
TABLE II
Descriptive Statistics and Partial Correlations (N = 39)
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Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Firm size 2.58 5.09 0 25
2. Firm age 3.09 2.31 0.5 9 0.48
3. Loan amount 392.85 1133.82 500 7000 0.48 0.37
4. Social Capital 4.76 1.84 0 7 -0.04 0.09 -0.27
5. Loan Type 1.25 0.44 1 2 -0.25 -0.11 -0.54 0.69
6. Firm Performance 1.45 1.10 0 4 -0.17 -0.19 -0.47 0.52 0.51
76
T A B L E m  
Results o f Ordinal Logit Analyses (N = 39)^
Social Capital Performance
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Firm size -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Firm age 0.29 -0.04 -0.09
(0.19) (0.15) (0.15)
Loan amount (USD) 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)




Cut 1 -1.41 -2.49 -1.05
(0.91) (1.03) (1.21)
Cut 2 -0.95 -0.77 0.89
(0.81) (0.95) (1.23)
Cut 3 0.42 0.80 2.57
(0.69) (0.97) (1.28)






Degrees o f Freedom 4 4 5
Log Likelihood -54.34 -49.57 -47.16
LL ratio test 32.03** 14.13** 18.94**
Pseudo R-squared .23 .13 .17
 ^ Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .0 5 , ** p <  .001; two-tailed test for variable coefficients.
